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112 S. Ct. at 1034. The latter, said the 
Court, was an entirely different ques-
tion, and therefore Davis did not alter 
the status of the presumption. Id. 
Respondents further argued that 
GuardiansAss 'nv. CivilServ. Comm 'n 
of New York City, 463 U.S.582 (1983), 
and Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), eroded 
the traditional presumption of relief. 
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. While 
acknowledging that the various opin-
ions in Guardians made it difficult to 
decipher the majority holding, the Court 
determined that the majority held that 
damages were available for an inten-
tional violation of a statute similar to 
Title IX. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. 
InDarrone, a unanimous court awarded 
backpay for another similar statute. Id. 
Thus, these cases, reasoned the Court, 
actually supported the presumption in 
favor of awarding damages. Id. 
The Court then addressed Respon-
dents' contention that Congress was 
silent with regard to damages in both 
the text and the legislative history of 
the statute. The Court noted that be-
cause Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), held that 
Title IX did not provide for an express 
right of action, it was not surprising 
that the statute was silent regarding 
remedies. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. 
The Court asserted that it was neces-
sary to look to the state of the law when 
Congress passed Title IX to determine 
whether remedies were available. Id. 
at 1036. In so doing, the Court held 
that the traditional presumption in fa-
vor of remedies existed at the time 
Title IX was enacted, and that neither 
subsequent case law nor statutes had 
altered the presumption. Id. Damages, 
therefore, were available for an action 
brought pursuant to Title IX. Id. at 
1036-37. 
The Respondents also argued that 
an award of damages would violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers, that 
the presumption in favor of damages 
did not apply when Congress enacts a 
statute pursuant to its Spending Clause 
power, and that if damages were avail-
able, they should be limited to backpay 
and prospective relief. Id. at 1037. In 
rejecting the argument that a damages 
award would violate the doctrine of 
separation of powers, the Court as-
serted that the discretion to award re-
lief did not increase judicial power or 
impinge on areas that were reserved to 
the executive and legislative branches. 
Id. The doctrine of separation of pow-
ers would actually be hanned if courts 
were permitted to decide against award-
ing damages, as such adjudication 
would frustrate and make useless causes 
of action authorized by Congress. Id. 
Continuing its analysis, the Court 
rejected the argument that the tradi-
tional presumption should not apply to 
statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's 
Spending Clause power. Id. The Court 
observed that in Pennhurst State Sch. 
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I 
(1981), remedies were limited under 
the Spending Clause power when the 
violation involved was unintentional 
because there was no notice of liabil-
ity. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037. The 
Court distinguished the instant case by 
concluding that the problem of notice 
was not implicated when the violation 
involved was intentional. Id. 
The Court also declined to limit the 
remedy under the statute to backpay 
and prospective relief, because they 
were inappropriate and insufficient. Id. 
at 1038. The remedy of back pay was 
useless here because Ms. Franklin was 
a student at the time of the violation, 
and prospective relief was insufficient 
because Ms. Franklin no longer at-
tended public school and Hill no longer 
taught at the school. Id. In addition, 
such limitations abandoned the tradi-
tional approach of allowing courts to 
decide the extent of remedies when a 
federal right has been violated. Id. 
By holding that damages were avail-
able to enforce an action pursuant to 
Title IX, the Franklin court empha-
sized the importance of providing rem-
edies for wrongs committed in viola-
tion offederal statutes. Because of the 
diversity on the Supreme Court, unani-
mous decisions are rare. Thus, on the 
heels of Justice Thomas's nomination 
hearings and the publicity and aware-
ness that the proceeding brought to the 
issue of sexual harassment, it appears 
that the issue of sexual harassment 
may have been a significant factor in 
the Court's decision. Nevertheless, to 
rule otherwise would have left Ms. 
Franklin and others similarly situated 
without any practical recourse under 
the law. While this decision will most 
likely increase the amount of sexual 
harassment cases litigated, hopefully it 
will serve as a deterrent as well. 
- Cheryl Zak 
Hafer v. Melo: STATE OFFICERS, 
EVEN WHEN ACTING IN THEIR 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, MAY BE 
PERSONALL Y LIABLE FOR 
DEPRIVA TION OF CITIZENS' 
FEDERAL RIGHTS. 
In Hafer v. Me/o, 112 S. C1. 358 
(J 991), the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that under title 42, section 
1983 of the United States Code, state 
officials may be held personally liable 
when performing functions within their 
official capacity. The Court found that 
this issue differed with a suit against an 
actual state office. In that case, be-
cause the state itself is the real party in 
interest, the action is futile since states 
are immune from civil actions for mon-
etary damages. If, however, state of-
ficers are sued personally for their ac-
tions in office, the party in interest is 
the named person and the state's im-
munities do not apply. 
In 1989, Barbara Hafer ran for the 
position of Auditor General of Penn-
sylvania. While campaigning, it was 
alleged that Hafer was given a list of 
twenty-one employees in the Auditor 
General's office who had secured their 
jobs through payments to a fonner 
employee. Hafer had promised to fire 
the people on the list ifshe was elected. 
After winning the election, Hafer fired 
eighteen people on the list, including 
James Melo, Jr., on the grounds that 
they had "bought" their jobs. 
Melo and seven others filed suit 
against Hafer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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alleging a violation of their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. Other fired em-
ployees filed a different claim under 
section 1983 for reinstatement and 
monetary damages. 
The federal district court consoli-
dated the claims and dismissed them. 
The court relied upon Will v. Michigan 
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 
(1989),andruledthattheclaimsagainst 
Hafer, a state official, were barred. In 
Will, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that state officials acting within 
their official capacities were outside 
the class of''persons'' subject to liabil-
ity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed the district court. Also 
relying on Will, but for different rea-
sons, the court of appeals ruled that 
claims for reinstatement against Hafer 
fell under "injunctive relief," and for 
the purposes of such relief, state offi-
cials sued in their official capacity are 
''persons'' subject to liability under 
section 1983. Furthermore, because 
Hafer's authority to hire and fire de-
rived from her position, the court found 
that she acted under the color of a state 
law and was thereby susceptible to a 
section 1983 claim. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether state officials might 
be held personally liable for damages 
under section 1983 based upon actions 
taken in their official capacities. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
O'Connor, first distinguished between 
personal and official-capacity suits. The 
Court explained that in an official-
capacity suit, where a state office is 
being sued, the suit is against the state. 
Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 361 (quoting Ken-
tucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 158, 166 
(1985». Ifan officer is sued in his or 
her official capacity and then leaves 
office, the new officer assumes the 
previous officer's position in the liti-
gation because the real party in interest 
is the governmental entity and not the 
named official. Id. Therefore, the 
immunities available to the officer are 
the same as those of the state. Id. at 
362. 
Alternatively, in a personal-capac-
ity suit where the party in interest is the 
individually named state officer, the 
court found that the state's immunities 
donotapply. Section 1983 was passed 
''to give a remedy to parties deprived of 
constitutional rights, privileges and 
immunities by an official's abuse of 
his position." Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 363. 
The Court acknowledged that section 
1983 was intended to be an exception 
to a state official's immunity and added 
that personal liability may be estab-
lished under section 1983 by showing 
that an official, acting under the color 
ofa state law, caused the deprivation of 
a federal right. Id. 
Hafer argued that because she was 
working in her official capacity at the. 
time of the alleged wrongdoing, the 
suit should have been barred under the 
language of Will v. Michigan Dept. of 
State Police. In support of her argu-
ment, Hafer also relied upon Cowan v. 
Univ. of Louisville Sch. of Medicine, 
" 900 F.2d 936,942-43 (6th Cir. 1990), 
which held that state officials may not 
be held personally liable when acting 
in their official capacity. She further 
contended that in order for her official 
work to be the subject of a personal 
suit, the work must be unnecessary for 
her position. Hafer argued that her 
employment decisions were a neces-
sary part of her official work and were 
therefore barred as subjects for a per-
sonal-capacity suit. Hafer, 112 S~ Ct. 
at 363. The Supreme Court rejected 
Hafer's first argument as unpersuasive 
and considered Cowan to have been 
foreclosed by prior decisions. Id. The 
Court stated that Hafer may be person-
ally liable precisely because of her 
authority as Auditor General and that 
whether the suit is personal or official 
depends upon the capacity in which 
she was sued, and not the capacity in 
which. she was working. Id. 
As for her argument of "neces-
sary" versus ''unnecessary'' official 
work, Hafer offered no authority for 
her reasoning, and the Court found no 
support for it in the broad language of 
section 1983. The Court rejected her 
arguments on the grounds that her 
theory would grant absolute immunity 
to state officials, which was inconsis-
tent with previous decisions and Con-
gressional intent. Id. The Court stated 
that section 1983 was enacted to im-
pose liability on state officials by 
"enforc[ing] provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment against those who 
carry a badge of authority of a state and 
represent it in some capacity, whether 
they act in accordance with their au-
thority or misuse it." Id. (quoting 
Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 
(1974) (emphasis added». The Court 
emphasized that absolute immunity is 
extended to very few officials, such as 
the "President of the United States, 
legislators in their legislative functions, 
and judges in their judicial function." 
Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 364. The Court did 
not believe that a state executive offi-
cial such as Hafer needed absolute 
immunity in order to perform her offi-
cial function as Auditor General. Id. 
Finally, Hafer argued that the case 
against her was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment, which she contended for-
bade personal-capacity suits against 
state officials in federal courts. Hafer, 
112 S. Ct. at 363. The Supreme Court 
distinguished and rejected her argu-
ment, ruling that the suit was a per-
sonal-capacity suit, not one against the 
State. Under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Court had previously ruled 
that damages against a state official in 
federal courts "[were] a pernlissible 
remedy in some circumstances not-
withstanding the fact that they hold 
public office." Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 363 
(quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238). 
The Court conceded that "imposing 
personal liability on state officers may 
hamper their performance of public 
duties." Hafer, 112 S. Ct. at 364. 
However, the Court added that the 
"framework of personal immunity ju-
risprudence" would sufficiently handle 
such concerns. Id. at 365. 
Hafer v. Melo resolved some ambi-
guities concerning a public official's 
personal liability for his or her actions 
while in office. The decision gives 
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notice to the public that they may suc-
cessfully sue a state official for the 
deprivation of their federal rights, 
whether the official was acting in ac-
cordance with the state's laws or in 
abuse of them. Hafer sends a message 
to public officials who do not enjoy 
absolute immunity that they will be 
held personally accountable for de-
priving citizens oftheir federal rights, 
regardless of the nature of officials' 
actions. With the cautionary signal 
that the Supreme Court is sending 
through Hafer, state officials must 
make less arbitrary, and more thought-
ful decisions or else be held account-
able to the public they serve. 
- Kenneth J. Goldsmith 
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources: 
WASTE IMPORT RESTRIC-
TIONS VIOLATE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
because solid waste is constitutionally 
protected as an article of commerce, 
any regulation imposed upon the move-
ment of solid waste must withstand 
strict scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause ofthe United States Constitu-
tion. The Court found that the waste 
import restrictions ofMichigan's Solid 
Waste Management Act ("SWMA") 
were economically protectionist and, 
thus, in violation of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
Two provisions implementing 
waste import restrictions were adopted 
in 1988 when Michigan's SWMA was 
amended. Section 299.413a prohib-
ited the disposal of solid waste from 
other counties and states in any county 
in Michigan. However, waste could be 
imported into a county ifthat county's 
solid waste management plan explic-
itly authorized the importation of out-
of -county waste. Fort Gratiot Sanitary 
Landfill (''Fort Gratiof') applied to the 
St. Clair County Solid Waste Planning 
Committee ("Committee") in 1989 for 
approval to accept out-of-state waste. 
Even though Fort Gratiot promised to 
reserve space for waste generated within 
the county, the Committee denied the 
application because the county's solid 
waste management plan did not autho-
rize the acceptance of waste originat-
ing outside the county. 
Fort Gratiot contested the decision, 
charging that Michigan's 1988 SWMA 
waste import restrictions were uncon-
stitutional because they authorized the 
counties to prevent privately owned 
operations from participating in inter-
state commerce. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan held that there was no 
fucial discrimination because the county 
plan did not treat states any worse than 
other counties in Michigan. The dis-
trict court noted that each county had 
the option of disallowing waste gener-
ated from outside the county to enter 
county landfills and, therefore, the stat-
ute did not place an outright ban on 
out-of-state waste. Based upon their 
analysis of Michigan's SWMA, the 
district court dismissed Fort Gratiot's 
complaint. The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trictcourt'sreasoningandaifmnedthe 
decision. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine 
the SWMA's constitutionality. The 
Supreme Court rejected the state court's 
analysis that solid waste had no consti-
tutional protection because it was val-
ueless. Id. at 2022. The Court rea-
soned that ''whether the business ar-
rangements between out-of-state gen-
erators of waste and the Michigan op-
eratorof a waste disposal site are viewed 
as "sales" of garbage or ''purchases'' of 
transportation and disposal services, 
the commercial transactions unques-
tionably have an interstate character." 
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. Re-
lying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
in which a New Jersey law prohibiting 
the importation of out of state waste 
was struck down as violative of the 
Commerce Clause, the Court stated 
that although solid waste has no value, 
it is an article of commerce and, there-
fore, the interstate movement of solid 
waste is regulated by the Commerce 
Clause. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 
2023 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978». 
Michigan and St. Clair County at-
tempted to circumvent the application 
of the Commerce Clause by distin-
guishing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
because there, the prohibition was 
placed only upon out-of-state waste. 
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. They 
argued that Michigan's SWMA did 
not place an unreasonable burden upon 
interstate commerce because the re-
strictions treated states and other Michi-
gan counties in a similar manner. Id. 
The Court, however, disagreed with 
this argument and declared that "a bur-
den imposed by a State upon interstate 
commerce is not to be sustained sim-
ply because the statute imposing it 
applies alike to the people of all the 
States, including the people ofthe State 
enacting such statute." Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2025 (quoting Brimmerv. 
Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891». 
The Court declared that it was im-
material that other counties in Michi-
gan had adopted separate plans which 
allowed the importation of out-of-
county waste. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2025. The discretion given to the 
counties by the SWMA amendments 
was deemed not to exempt the statute 
from scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause. Id. at 2025-26. As in 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where a 
New Jersey statute gave a state agency 
the permission to import certain cat-
egories of waste, the Court in Fort 
Gratiot held that Michigan's authori-
zation for counties to accept out-of-
county waste ''merely reduced the scope 
of the discrimination," but it did not 
cure the discriminatory effect upon 
interstate commerce. Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2025. 
The Court noted that under the 
Commerce Clause, a state statute that 
discriminates against interstate com-
merce is unconstitutional "unless the 
discrimination is demonstrably justi-
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